A Maine roofing contractor's continued refusal to obey a federal court order to correct safety hazards and pay more than $400,000 in fines could send him to jail.
The US Department of Labor has asked the US Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit in Boston to hold Stephen Lessard in civil contempt for defying a December 2011 court order to correct violations cited by OSHA and pay $404,000 in fines and interest levied from 2000 to 2011.
During that time, his companies, Lessard Roofing & Siding, Inc., and Lessard Brothers Construction, Inc., both located in Greene, Maine, were cited for safety violations 11 times at 11 different work sites in Maine. Each time, Lessard did not respond and the citations turned into final orders, requiring him to provide OSHA with proof of correction and payment of the assessed fines. When he again refused to act, the department sought and obtained the court decree.
"This is scofflaw behavior by a serial violator who demonstrates contempt—not only for the law and the US Court of Appeals, but for the safety and lives of his employees," said Maryann Medeiros, OSHA's area director in Maine. "What's especially disturbing is that many of the violations involve fall hazards, which are the primary cause of death in construction work, the industry in which Mr. Lessard and his companies operate."
"We have asked the court to subject Mr. Lessard to strong sanctions, including incarceration if necessary, should he continue to flout the law and the court's earlier order," said Michael Felsen, the department's regional solicitor of labor for New England. "Seeking a contempt order, such as this, is a stringent and infrequent action, but one that is more than warranted in this case."
The page offers fact sheets, posters, and videos that vividly illustrate various fall hazards and appropriate preventive measures.
How to Implement OSHA’s Globally Harmonized Hazard Communication Standard (GHS)
OSHA has issued a final rule revising its Hazard Communication Standard, aligning it with the United Nations’ globally harmonized system (GHS) for the classification and labeling of hazardous chemicals. This means that virtually every product label, safety data sheet (formerly called “material safety data sheet” or MSDS), and written hazard communication plan must be revised to meet the new standard. Worker training must be updated so that workers can recognize and understand the symbols and pictograms on the new labels as well as the new hazard statements and precautions on safety data sheets.
Jacksonville RCRA and DOT Training
New Orleans RCRA and DOT Training
Philadelphia RCRA and DOT Training
Public Health Protective Concentration for Para-Chlorobenzene Sulfonic Acid
pCBSA is a by-product of the production of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) and is often found in soil at former DDT manufacturing sites. pCBSA is highly water soluble and has contaminated aquifers beneath these sites.
A public health protective concentration is a health-based advisory level that OEHHA develops for a chemical in drinking water for which there is no public health goal or formal regulatory standard. Like a public health goal, a public health protective concentration is based on a risk assessment using the most current principles, practices, and methods in the fields of toxicology, epidemiology, and risk assessment. The susceptibility and exposure of infants and children is explicitly incorporated into the assessment. A public health protective concentration differs from a public health goal in that it does not undergo formal public review and comment, or an external scientific peer review.
Regulatory entities can use a public health protective concentration as guidance in their management of potential drinking water sources where the chemical may be present. Like a public health goal, a public health protective concentration is not a boundary line between a "safe" and "dangerous" level of a contaminant. Drinking water can still be considered acceptable for public consumption if it contains a chemical at a level exceeding the public health protective concentration.
Oregon Announces 2014 Workplace Deaths
Thirty-one people covered by the Oregon workers' compensation system died on the job during 2014, the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) announced recently. It's up slightly from 2013's figure of 30 deaths, but continues to be consistent with fatality counts in recent years.
The year 2010 marked the state's all-time low of 17 deaths. That figure was likely tied, in part, to the economic downturn. In 2012, there were 30 deaths and, in 2011, 28 people died on the job.
State and local government saw the largest concentration of deaths in 2014, with five workers killed in that industry. The agriculture sector, which includes logging operations, had four deaths—the same as transportation and warehousing.
"Although Oregon workplaces are safer today than in previous decades, there are still far too many preventable tragedies each year," said Patrick Allen, director of DCBS. "We must continue our commitment to eliminating hazards in the workplace so that all Oregon workers can come home safely at the end of the day."
Workplace fatalities are down significantly compared to previous decades. In the 1990s, there was an average of 55 workplace deaths per year. In the 1980s, the average was 81 deaths. The statewide rate of reported workplace injuries and illnesses has also decreased more than 50% since the late 1980s. Oregon started tracking workplace deaths in 1943.
"When we discuss the fatalities each year, it is a sobering reminder our past success can become, in some measure, a challenge to our future achievements," said Michael Wood, Oregon OSHA administrator. "We have pushed the numbers down over the past decades. But we will not push them still lower unless we can persuade each other—and ourselves—that they can and must continue to go lower."
Oregon OSHA offers educational workshops, consultation services, training videos, and website information to help Oregon employers create or improve their safety and health programs.
DCBS compiles fatality statistics from records of death claim benefits paid by Oregon workers' compensation insurers during the calendar year. The data excludes workplace deaths involving self-employed individuals, city of Portland police and fire employees, federal employees, and incidents occurring in Oregon to individuals with out-of-state employers. These workers are either not subject to Oregon workers' compensation coverage requirements or are covered by other compensation systems.
Deaths that occur during a prior calendar year may appear in the compensable fatality count for a later year because of the time required to process a claim. The fatality count for 2013 changed from 29 to 30 due to a change in status discovered after the reference year had closed.
Complete data on all deaths caused by injuries in Oregon workplaces, regardless of whether they are covered by workers' compensation insurance, are computed separately and reported in the annual Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) administered by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 2014 CFOI count is not expected for release until fall 2015.
CSB Releases Technical Analysis Detailing Likely Causes of 2010 Zinc Explosion and Fire
Two Horsehead operators, James Taylor and Corey Keller, were killed when the column violently ruptured inside the facility’s refinery building, where multiple zinc distillation columns were operating. The rupture released a large amount of zinc vapor, which at high temperatures combusts spontaneously in the presence of air. The two men had been performing unrelated maintenance work on another nearby column when the explosion and fire occurred. A third operator was seriously injured and could not return to work.
The incident was investigated by multiple agencies including the CSB and OSHA, but its underlying cause had remained unexplained. In the fall of 2014, CSB contracted with an internationally known zinc distillation expert to conduct a comprehensive review of the evidence file, including witness interviews, company documents, site photographs, surveillance videos, laboratory test results, and data from the facility’s distributed control system (DCS). The 57-page report of this analysis, prepared by Mr. William Hunter of the United Kingdom, was released recently by the CSB. Draft versions of the report were reviewed by Horsehead and by the United Steelworkers local that represented Horsehead workers in Monaca; their comments are included in the final report as appendices.
In the years following the 2010 incident, the Horsehead facility in Monaca was shut down and dismantled. The “New Jersey” zinc process, a distillation-based method that was first developed in the 1920’s and was used for decades in Monaca, is no longer practiced anywhere in the United States, although a number of overseas companies, especially in China, continue to use it.
“Although this particular zinc technology has ceased being used in the US, we felt it was important to finally determine why this tragedy occurred,” said CSB Chairperson Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso. “Our hope is that this will at last provide a measure of closure to family members, as well as inform the safety efforts of overseas companies using similar production methods.”
The Hunter report was based on expert professional opinion, and did not involve any onsite examination of the evidence. CSB investigators made several short deployments to the Horsehead site in 2010 following the incident, interviewing a number of witnesses and documenting conditions at the site.
The explosion involved an indoor distillation column several stories tall. The column consisted of a vertical stack of 48 silicon carbide trays, topped by a reflux tower, and assembled by bricklayers using a specialized mortar. The bottom half of the column was surrounded by a masonry combustion chamber fueled by natural gas and carbon monoxide waste gas. Horsehead typically operated columns of this type for up to 500 days, at which time the columns were dismantled and rebuilt using new trays.
The explosion on July 22, 2010, occurred just 12 days after the construction and startup of “Column B.” Column B was used to separate zinc—which flowed as a liquid from the bottom of the column—from lower-boiling impurities such as cadmium, which exited as a vapor from the overhead line. The column, which operated at more than 1600?F, normally has only small amounts of liquid metals in the various trays, but flooding of the column creates a very hazardous condition, the analysis noted. Such flooding likely occurred on July 22, 2010.
“Under extreme pressure the tray wall(s) eventually failed, releasing a large volume of zinc vapor and superheated zinc that would flash to vapor, and this pressure pushed out the combustion chamber blast panels,” Mr. Hunter’s report concluded. “The zinc spray and vapor now had access to large amounts of workplace air and this created a massive zinc flame across the workplace.”
After examining all the data, the report determined that the explosion likely occurred because of a partial obstruction of the column sump, a drain-like masonry structure at the base of the column that had not been replaced when the column was rebuilt in June 2010. The previous column that used this sump had to be shut down prematurely due to sump drainage problems, the analysis found. These problems were never adequately corrected, and various problems with the sump were observed during the July 2010 startup of the new Column B. Over at least an hour preceding the explosion, DCS data indicate a gradual warming at the base of Column B, as liquid zinc likely built up and flooded the lower trays, while vapor flow to the overhead condenser ceased.
Ten minutes before the explosion, an alarm sounded in the control room due to a high rate of temperature change in the column waste gases, as zinc likely began leaking out of the column into the combustion chamber, but by then it was probably too late to avert an explosion, according to the analysis. Control room operators responded to the alarm by cutting the flow of fuel gas to Column B but did not reduce the flow of zinc into the column. The unsafe condition of Column B was not understood, and operators inside the building were not warned of the imminent danger.
The technical analysis determined that there was likely an underlying design flaw in the Column B sump involving a structure known as an “underflow” —similar to the liquid U-trap under a domestic sink. The small clearance in the underflow—just 65 millimeters or the height on one brick—had been implicated in other zinc column explosions around the world, and likely allowed dross and other solids to partially obstruct the sump and cause a gradual accumulation of liquid zinc in the column. Liquid zinc in the column causes a dangerous pressure build-up at the bottom and impairs the normal evaporation of vapor, which would otherwise cool the liquid zinc. Instead the liquid zinc becomes superheated by the heat from the combustion chamber, with the pressure eventually rupturing the column and allowing the “explosive decompression.”
The report noted that the Column B sump had previously been used with a different type of column that had a much lower rate of liquid run-off through the sump, so the problem with the sump was only exacerbated when Column B was constructed to separate zinc from cadmium, increasing the liquid flow rate into the sump by a factor of four to five.
The report concluded that Horsehead may have missed several opportunities to avoid the accident, overlooking symptoms of a blocked column sump that were evident days before the accident. “Missing these critical points indicates that, in large measure, hazardous conditions at Monaca had been ‘normalized’ and that process management had become desensitized to what was going on. This raises the question whether sufficient technical support was provided to the plant on a regular basis,” according to Mr. Hunter.
The report noted that New Jersey-type zinc distillation columns have been involved in numerous serious incidents around the world. In 1993 and 1994, two column explosions at a former French zinc factory killed a total of 11 workers. An international committee of experts who investigated the incidents in France identified up to 10 other major incidents at other sites attributable to sump drainage problems. The Monaca facility had suffered five documented column explosions prior to 2010, but none with fatalities, according to the CSB-commissioned report.
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating serious chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.
The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to facilities, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA.
Hussman Corp.’s Failure to Address Safety Hazards Leads to Worker Fatality
A 58-year-old maintenance worker was killed after he was pinned between a scrap metal table and a railing at Hussmann Corp.'s, Bridgeton facility, an investigation by OSHA found. As a result, Hussmann received three willful and 12 serious safety violations after the September 6, 2014, incident.
"This tragic loss could have been prevented," said Bill McDonald, OSHA's area director in St. Louis. "OSHA inspectors found workers at risk of life-threatening hazards because Hussmann Corp. failed to train its workforce to prevent unintentional operation of dangerous machinery. This company needs to fix safety procedure deficiencies, so no other family is forced to suffer."
A willful violation is one committed with intentional, knowing or voluntary disregard for the law's requirement, or with plain indifference to employee safety and health.
OSHA also discovered electrical safety hazards involving cabinets that were not closed properly to prevent contact with energized wires and using damaged electrical cables. In total, OSHA cited the company for 12 serious violations.
A serious violation occurs when there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known.
OSHA has proposed penalties of $272,250.
K&F Construction Fined $109,450 for Fall Hazards
K&F Construction employees performing roofing operations as part of the construction of three-story townhomes in Morgantown, West Virginia, were exposed to serious fall hazards.
Additionally, K&F did not ensure workers wore eye protection while using a pneumatic nail gun to lay the felt paper.
One alleged serious violation was due to the company's inappropriate use of a forklift to support a scaffold platform that employees used while working on a wall structure.
This company is well aware of the necessary safeguards needed to prevent fall-related and other injuries or deaths," said Prentice Cline, director of OSHA's Charleston Area Office. "With falls the leading cause of death in the construction industry, it is critical that this employer immediately address the cited violations to ensure a safe and healthful workplace."
Proposed penalties total $109,450.
Franco Roofing Inc. Fined $73,920 for Fall Hazards
Franco Roofing, Inc. was cited by OSHA for seven repeat and four serious violations of workplace safety and health standards. These include lack of fall protection for employees during the replacement of a residential roof, which exposed employees to falls hazards of more than 23 feet. An additional fall hazard stemmed from the employer's failure to provide general safety and health training, such as scaffold safety, ladder safety or fall protection training, to employees.
OSHA issued repeat citations for this employer's history of fall protection violations. Franco Roofing, Inc. was previously cited by OSHA for similar violations in June 2011 and July 2012 for worksites located in Yonkers, New York, and Greenwich, Connecticut.
"The penalties proposed in this case demonstrate the severe nature of the cited hazards and the negligence of this employer when it comes to worker protection," said Diana Cortez, OSHA area director in Tarrytown. "Falls, slips and other injuries can and should be avoided at all cost through the use of proper equipment and training, and OSHA will not tolerate companies that don't adhere to basic safety standards."
Niece Products Faces over $60K in Fines for Endangering Workers
Workers welding inside steel tanks were exposed to toxic fumes because their employer lacked an effective program to protect them, an inspection by OSHA has found. Proposed penalties total $60,200.
"Welding inside a confined space, such as a tank, can expose employees to toxic fumes with immediate health impacts," said Judy Freeman, OSHA's area director in Wichita. "Employers are required and must take specific measures to protect workers in these environments."
OSHA found that Niece Products did not evaluate employee exposure to respiratory hazards associated with welding inside tanks and lacked a written respiratory protection program.
A confined space is one large enough for workers to enter and perform certain jobs, such as a holding tank, but it has limited or restricted means for entry or exit and is not designed for continuous occupancy.
Numerous additional violations were found in the corrugated metal paint booth, including using a paint shaker, which can produce sparks; electrical equipment not rated for exposure to flammable materials; improper storage of flammable materials; and failing to display no smoking signs.
Based in Fort Scott, Niece Products employs about 40 people who manufacture, sell and lease water and fuel trucks, and water towers used in the construction industry. The company is owned by Niece Equipment in Irving, Texas, and employs nearly 100 workers corporate-wide.
Advance Auto Parts Exposes Workers to Asbestos, Mold Hazards
"Exposure to asbestos is a dangerous workplace issue that can cause loss of lung function and cancer, among other serious health effects. When Advance Auto uses an older building with presumed asbestos-containing material, such as floor tiles, it has a responsibility to conduct periodic air monitoring and must post warning signs for workers," said Barbara Theriot, OSHA's area director in Kansas City. "The company also has a responsibility to maintain the building in a sanitary and safe manner. OSHA found persistent flooding, which caused mold growth and created lower-level slip and fall hazards. This is unacceptable."
OSHA inspectors tested bulk samples of furnace room floor tiles and found they contained 3% chrysotile, a form of asbestos. Sample air monitoring did not detect asbestos fibers circulating in the heating and air conditioning system. However, particles could become airborne from deteriorating tiles and persistent flooding, a consistent issue throughout the building.
Asbestos is a naturally occurring mineral fiber used in some building materials before its health dangers were discovered. Asbestos fibers are invisible and can be inhaled into the lungs unknowingly. Inhaled fibers can then become embedded in the lungs.
OSHA also noted a repeated violation for failing to provide inspectors with injury and illness logs. Based in Roanoke, Virginia, Advance Auto Parts was previously cited for this violation in a Delaware, Ohio, store in 2010 and a Lakeland, Florida, store in 2011. OSHA issues repeated violations if an employer was cited previously for the same or a similar violation within the last five years.
OSHA Fines Bluewater Thermal Solutions $42,000 for 8 Safety Violations
Hi Temp Northlake, LLC, operating as Bluewater Thermal Solutions in Northlake, Illinois, a subsidiary of Bluewater Thermal Solutions of Greenville, South Carolina, was fined $42,000 for exposing workers to serious safety hazards. The company specializes in heat treating powder metal parts.
Workers at Bluewater Thermal Solutions were exposed to dangerous chemicals, such as anhydrous ammonia, which was utilized as fuel at the Northlake metal heat treating facility. Ammonia can be a health hazard because it is corrosive to the skin, eyes, and lungs. It is also a flammable vapor.
A total of six serious violations were cited involve failing to:
- Develop an appropriate process safety employee participation plan
- Develop written operating procedures
- Train workers on the hazards associated with chemicals used in the work process and protective measures
- Identify safeguards to control hazards, such as a potential ammonia leak
"Exposure to anhydrous ammonia can cause severe health effects and must be prevented," said Angeline Loftus, OSHA's area director in Chicago North. "Workers should not be put at risk because Bluewater Thermal Solutions failed to implement the required protections."
MIOSHA Renews Alliance with Michigan Non-Profit Training Facility to Protect Workers
The Michigan Laborers’ Training & Apprenticeship Institute (MLTAI) and Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA) recently renewed a formal alliance to help members and participants recognize and prevent construction hazards to foster safer and more healthful Michigan workplaces. The MIOSHA program is a part of the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA).
The renewed alliance, which was first formed in 2011, formalizes a working relationship between the MLTAI and MIOSHA to utilize the MLTAI’s state-of-the-art training centers to provide members and others with information, guidance, and unique safety and health training opportunities. The alliance focuses on those who work on energy distribution, renewable energy, home weatherization, building trades and/or civil, and heavy highway projects.
“The Michigan Laborers’ Training and Apprenticeship Institute recognizes the value of establishing a collaborative relationship to advance Michigan’s workplace safety and health,” said MIOSHA Director Martha Yoder. “MIOSHA is pleased to continue this alliance, which will further expand our outreach and education efforts to ensure the protection of Michigan’s construction workers.”
Key goals of the alliance include:
- Provide the 5,000 participants they train each year with the best, most dynamic and engaging safety and health training, with an emphasis on pre-job planning
- Provide detailed hands-on training to guarantee that MIOSHA regulations are implemented on participant jobsites
- Collaborate with MIOSHA to provide simulated jobsite safety inspections during some MIOSHA 10-hour and 30-hour seminars
- Provide training participants with the skills needed to implement and participate in accident prevention programs
- Share information on MLTAI and MIOSHA websites and through other communication methods to improve the working environments of the participants
- Work with the seven Laborers' Locals, the EPA Minority Grant Department and all participating contractor associations throughout Michigan to promote MIOSHA Consultation Education and Training (CET) Division services
“I can personally attest to the success of this MIOSHA/MLTAI alliance,” said MLTAI Assistant Director Daryl Gallant. “This alliance has greatly improved the communication between all the partners, including The MLTAI training staff, students, MIOSHA, and the contractors. Our students have provided positive feedback every time a MIOSHA representative visits the training center. This alliance is a daily reminder to the MLTAI that we should be making the attempt at safety outreach with a goal to exchange productive ideas. We all share the same vision for our workforce to return home safe to their families each and every day that they work construction.”
MIOSHA alliances enable organizations committed to workplace safety and health to collaborate with MIOSHA to prevent workplace injuries and illnesses. Alliances are open to all groups, including trade or professional associations, businesses, labor organizations, educational institutions, and government agencies.
There are many benefits to participating in an alliance with MIOSHA, including:
- Building trusting, cooperative relationships
- Networking with others committed to workplace safety and health
- Exchanging information about best practices
- Leveraging resources to maximize worker safety and health protection
The MLTAI works with local unions and signatory employers by training and mentoring a diverse group of apprentices and journey workers in workplace safety and health issues. It provides ongoing training and education opportunities to our members, minorities, displaced and incumbent workers. The MLTAI prides itself on tailoring the training needs of its signatory employers by adjusting classes to meet their needs and set a high standard of training.
Safety News Links
Do You Have News to Share?